The emergence of a lex specialis regime and its interaction with the established, governing lex generalis in their overlapping spheres of application is always an intriguing legal relationship to explore. In this article, the focus will be on the development of legal principles and rules that has/can be collectively described as lex sportiva.
Introduction
The natural impulse of any emerging branch of law is to define itself by delimiting its area of influence by comparison to other more established areas. In that struggle it is almost unavoidable attempting to fence off the influence of public policy or mandatory provisions in a sort of becoming-of-age legal ritual. That is the context where the lex sportiva finds itself at the moment: a look to the past -with a reminiscence of traditional roots of the lex mercatoria -, an orientation to the future -consolidation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)-, and
The difficulty is that this conceptualisation-i.e. the precedents of the CAS -is only shared in the American literature, 3 and not even uniformly. 4 Even assuming that the majority of the North American CAS' arbitrators shared Lenard's view, they only represent a 14% of the total. 5 Perhaps the debate cannot be about the existence, but it certainly needs to be about its nature since the consequences can be substantial since it is expected to affect any party involved in a sports-related dispute, whether it is before CAS or another panel, whether it is a regulatory issue (e.g. doping) or more commercial.
Certainly, not all of the panellists of CAS are convinced of the extent of the lex sportiva. To that end the Advisory opinion Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & World Antidoping Agency provided to FIFA in relation to its obligation to amend its Anti-doping rules to comply with WADA Code, it expressly said '[t]he exact content and the boundaries of the concept of a lex sportiva are still far too vague and uncertain to enable it to be used to determine the specific rights and obligations of sports associations towards athletes '. 6 When it comes to use the notion of lex sportiva, there are roughly two dividing lines. Those who want to use the concept of lex sportiva, taking the words of Denning L.J. in Combe v Combe, as a shield and as a sword, 7 carving out an area free from government regulation and also relying on it to override any resource to dispute resolution mechanisms or protection of the national or supranational law; and those who seek to determine the elements that are unique and distinctive of sport and which need to be preserved.
For the former group the ultimate goal of the lex sportiva is, as expressed by Beloff and Beloff, ' to immunise sport from the reach of the law, to create, in other words, a field of autonomy onto which even appellate sports tribunals should not trespass '. 8 Under that perception, the blanket of the lex sportiva seems to be stretched almost capriciously calling for assistance from the governments (for example, the fight against doping consolidated in the International 15 This search for legitimacy seems to rest in the wrong pillars. Firstly, the judgements invoked in assistance of an implied recognition by the courts of a lex specialis, are based precisely in a lack of legal entity to the disputes. Conversely, if the dispute had substantial legal issues to be considered, the court could not accept self-regulation. Secondly, unlike the lex mercatoria, considered as a body of law created by the collective of merchants, the defenders of an autonomous lex sportiva have an excessive CAS-centrism which fails to provide a theoretical underpinning of the proposition because lex sportiva needs to be able to exist on its own. Otherwise no lex specialis would exist outside the organisation or organisations which purports to apply it. It would be as if Waincymer indicates that one problems of the use of lex mercatoria in commercial arbitration is that 'the content usually combines principles that are truly accepted by all civilised countries and other principles that are more aspirational in the context of the proponents' thoughts about the needs of international commerce'. 27 The author refers a non-exhaustive list of principles some of which are shared with lex sportiva as cited by Parrish: 'the contra proferentem principle, equal treatment, proportionality, due process, the right to be heard and the duty to give reasons' as principles adapted to sport by the lex sportiva. 28 The difficulty is that while the principles are no doubt beneficial, it lacks specificity and foreseeability. Rodríguez Fernández attempts to explain the suitability of lex mercatoria to commercial relations, bearing testimony of the controversy existing to accept the delimitation of the term. 30 The sources of this law would be uniform terms and conditions published by international agencies, general terms and assisted by the enforcement of the international arbitration. 31 In reality, this system of lex mercatoria wouldn't be so inconvenient. The difficulty comes when the parties subject to the dispute are expected to be bound by usages and customs not adhered to in the contract or just not published. With regards to the idea of the arbitrators sifting through the pith of commercial customs, it is distant from reality, since the arbitrators are normally chosen on the basis of their expertise in a specific area. It would be illogical that, for example, a banking expert was asked to adjudicate in a construction or shipping dispute precisely for the specialist nature of the norms. At the same time, the idea of arbitrators as "communicators of law" is against the idea of arbitration as a confidential dispute resolution mechanism.
In reality, the lex mercatoria of Rodríguez Fernández is distant from the idea of commercial law created by the Two final salient points for those theorists of the lex sportiva as a new lex mercatoria is that the customs were frequently faked to create a custom once it was accepted by the arbitrators 37 and 'merchants sometimes had good reason to want an authoritative institution -e.g., court, public legislature, or guild -to establish a rule for them '. 38 Therefore, the traditional perception of lex mercatoria as a custom created rule which would be enforced by special courts and or arbitrators is detached from reality. In fact, the realities of the lex mercatoria provide an interesting lesson for the lex sportiva. The contractual creation of obligations between the parties is not going to be threatened by the national or transnational laws. A great deal of self-regulation needs to be promoted and protected. However, these creations will find gaps and inconsistencies that need to be filled with specific solutions.
The reference to general principles will aid in the interpretation of the rule, but a rule needs to exist in the first place. Accordingly, just as for the merchants in the Middle Ages, the complementary use of legislation will provide certainty and resolution.
In reality as Hatzimihail shows, the use of lex mercatoria has nothing to do with the historical accuracy of the concept. In fact, the 'historical revisionism has so far made few inroads among mercatorists or even in the 32 WADA, 'World Anti-Doping Code' <www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti- In conclusion, the comparison between the two ambitions of transnational law shows that in the apparently innocuous terminology there are two agendas, the ones who want to enhance the ability of self-regulate to exclude other foreign laws and the ones who want to create a legitimate space for a branch of law.
Proposal for a concept of lex sportiva
The previous sections have been exploring the whys of the framework of lex sportiva. This section tackles the different interpretations of the concept.
Lex sportiva as CAS jurisprudence
In section 2 above it was sketched out that a number of North American authors consider lex sportiva as CAS jurisprudence and the fact that this opinion is debated. CAS panels have also been inclined to share this view. In
Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) & Beckie Scott v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), the panel
confirmed that the reliance on CAS precedents by the parties amounts to a choice of law of lex sportiva.
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The proposition has two serious flaws and one important risk. The first flaw is the lack of precedent setting intention or indeed capacity; the second, the lack of availability of the awards. The risk is, again, the dubious strength of a body of law which exists no further from the Arbitral Tribunal that holds it as mentioned before. The referred flaws are dealt with next.
Looking at the doctrine of stare decicis or precedent setting, CAS panels concede importance to the previous decisions, but avoid creating an obligation to do so. This reluctance by the panels themselves is not coincidental. CAS panellists come from different legal traditions.
Binding precedent is generally assumed in the legal tradition of equity (or court-created law) and much less by the called civil law tradition. 47 While common law practitioners are used to the gap-filling function of the decisions of the courts, civil law lawyers normally take a more persuasive authority approach, trying to present previous decisions as one more argument in the balance. Be it as it may, precedent setting is unheard of in the field of arbitration. Dealing with the value of previous awards in commercial arbitration, Blackaby and others express the lack of binding precedent of arbitral awards saying that the "award of the first tribunal, if it is knownand it may not be known, because of confidentiality-may be of persuasive effect, but no more". 48 Even accepting a purpose as decisive authority, Born accepts that this 'does not mean that they enjoy binding authority'.
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With those ambitions of Supreme Court for sport it cannot be surprising that sports law practitioners propose a Grand Chamber of CAS precisely to resolve contradictions between CAS awards and to set precedence. 50 This proposal implies acceptance by those who operate in the sector that CAS jurisprudence is not a body of law.
However, whether a tribunal is formed of three arbitrators or five, it cannot purport to have a higher -for betterperspective of the interpretation of the applicable law. That goes against the very nature of arbitration understood as consensual, non-governmental, impartial decision made on the merits of the case, final and binding on the parties. 51 An arbitral award can be a very persuasive authority, but should not be more than that. Authors who have considered this specific aspect don't go as far as saying that the CAS produces a proper 'case law', understood in the common law rule of precedent setting, but a persuasive precedent in the way of civil law jurisdictions. Mitten asserts that previous decisions serve as guidance to ensure that like cases are treated alike in accordance with Swiss public policy. 52 McLaren, himself a frequently appointed CAS arbitrator, points out that while there is no obligation to follow previous rulings arbitrators typically do so for the sake of clarity. 53 The fact that CAS awards refer to previous decisions is completely understandable; a panel dealing with technical issues (for example, doping), or with specialist contractual matters (for example, transfer rules) would seek guidance and reassurance in previous decisions. However it doesn't mean that CAS panels intend to establish a binding precedent.
Intrinsically linked to the issue of binding effect is the second flaw, which is the availability of CAS awards, it needs to be pointed out that while CAS published digests of its decisions, it wasn't until 2009 that CAS started to make available a large number of its award. 54 It is still a work in progress and confidentiality may still restrict publication of important decisions. CAS awards in appeal (i.e. appeal against decisions of sport governing bodies) are made public, unless both parties agree that they should remain confidential (article R59 of CAS Code 55 ), but those coming from the ordinary procedure (i.e. arbitration referred to directly by the parties) are meant to be confidential unless both parties agree that they would be published (article R43 of the CAS Code). In those countries with legal tradition of precedent setting, public hearings and case reporting are essential. Lenard considers the importance of publication of CAS awards to improve and refine the lex sportiva, but this is tiptoeing a very essential feature of arbitration, which is confidentiality. Therefore, lex sportiva as the body of CAS awards is clearly an inappropriate concept. CAS panels don't have the vocation or possibility of setting precedent and the insufficient number of available decisions create unpredictability.
Lex sportiva as CAS jurisprudence, general principles and sports regulations
Some authors understand the concept of lex sportiva not as a noun, but as an adverb which accompanies anything "sport". In that way, Lorenzo Casini includes the 'whole complex of norms produced and implemented by regulatory sporting regimes', including IFs and NGBs, in addition to 'principles and rules' created by CAS and international law. 59 Casini laments that the existence of a lex sportiva, which he also calls global sports law, is not universally accepted. According to this thesis, lex sportiva would be everything and anything produced by sports governing bodies and CAS with influences of international law. Even so, Casini finds enough reasons to postulate a self-regulation based in lex sportiva. 60 This posture would lead to the risks referred to by Gary Born in relation to the undefined nature of international public policy. 61 The moment that arbitrators can consider themselves bound by that lex sportiva, the parties in the dispute would encounter a legal dimension not necessarily foreseen.
Richard Parrish's contribution to the concept is in similar broad terms: 'statutes and regulations of federations as interpreted by institutions of alternative dispute resolution', incorporating 'provisions of national, European and international law '. 62 This fully comprehensive definition doesn't explain why it is necessary to integrate provisions of foreign laws in the idea of a lex sportiva. The uniqueness of lex sportiva needs to come from its character, not from the assimilation of other legal concepts.
With regards to EU sports law -the application of EU law to sporting contexts -Parrish suggests that it 'only patrols the outer limits of the lex sportiva, thus helping to shape the standards with which the CAS develops this law'. 63 Again, it can be seen a sense CAS-centrism to the lex sportiva. Regardless, the co-habitation between lex sportiva and outside law -whether it may be EU law or other -would be ideal, but the assumption is that there is an agreement as to the actual scope; and that the arbitrators will find the balance between lex sportiva and EU law. With regards to the first aspect, it is clearly not an agreed terminology. With respect to the second point, it doesn't resit the test of the cases in which mandatory provisions of EU have been disregarded as non-applicable.
This kind of lex sportiva has nothing of lex specialis; in reality is an all-absorbing entity of law. It creates more uncertainty than security, which is precisely the reason for distinction. 65 The implication, therefore, is that these principles are somehow above the actual regulations.
Lex sportiva as rules of the game
Similar principle was applied in Boxing Australia v. AIBA pointing that equal treatment and level playing were part of this lex sportiva overriding the agreed regulations. 66 Accordingly, the sports regulator, i.e. the draftsperson in charge of developing regulations, and perhaps more importantly, the appointed dispute settler, e.g. disciplinary bodies and arbitrators, should be aware of those underlining principles which would override the consensus of the self-regulation.
Some attempt to specify these principles was given by Michael Beloff QC, an arbitrator in the CAS, who considers lex sportiva the body of specialist doctrines and principles of 'application only in a sporting context' to include no intervention with an official's decisions, comfortable satisfaction for sporting disciplinary offences, strict liability rule in relation to doping violations; and the bias towards eligibility in sport competition. 67 The clear advantages of these principles outlined by Beloff are that they are overwhelmingly accepted in the sport -whether formally organised or not -, they emanate from the rules themselves and they are so intrinsic to sport that its character of lex specialis cannot be disputed. Nonetheless, if lex sportiva is taken to be 'rules of the game', then, following the reflection of Kadens lex mercatoria, you don't need to coin a new term to explain something that has always existed. 68 Beloff himself alleges that some classical purists would rather use lex ludica for the same principles, but the difference goes beyond purist and purister. 69 The reason why ENIC used lex ludica seems to be not pedantry, but deliberate intention of establishing the core of the organisation of sport which shall not be regulated from outside the sport.
Calling lex sportiva to the rules of the game is misleading. The same way that lex mercatoria is the law of commerce, lex sportiva needs to be the law of sport. It would be rather pompous if the 'law' component is only the rules created for the better performance of a particular sport. This concept of lex sportiva, therefore, is not satisfactory for insufficient. 
Lex sportiva as a myth and proposal of a Global Sports Law

Defining lex sportiva
As seen above, there is no agreement in the conceptualisation of lex sportiva. At the same time, it cohabits with a number of other theoretical notions which go undisputed: rules of the game (or lex ludica, for those so purist), CAS jurisprudence, sports regulations. All these labels convey an idea and have autonomous identity. Even those authors who provide a comprehensive and logical suggestion, refuse the term of lex sportiva. Therefore, one way to overcome that debate would be to provide an adequate definition, not a charter, of lex sportiva.
Neither "general principles of law applicable to sports" or "sports regulations, laws and general principles of law" are usable or practical definitions. There is no reason for sport to expect a different application of the general legal principles or laws, and the sports regulations, while common in some aspects, are result of the agreement of its stakeholders. Put it simply, a hockey player cannot be expected to learn the regulations applicable to tennis or basketball because it may apply to him or her on the basis they all are sports.
The proposed definition for lex sportiva would be "general principles of the regulations of sport shared by the sports community". This notion can be applied by dispute resolution mechanisms -whether it may be the CAS or any other arbitration body or disciplinary tribunal -but it doesn't make it dependent of them nor needs its recognition in order to be enforceable. Very much like a custom legally enforceable, the principles shared by the regulations of sport are easily recognised and expected.
This kind of lex sportiva would be the principle integrity in sport (reflected in the fight against doping and against undue influence in the result of a game by way of betting), fair play, and competitive balance of any competition.
Furthermore, this idea of lex sportiva doesn't exclude other non-sport related organisations from its application and assistance. Global Sports Law, related exclusively to the regulation of International Sports Federations and 70 CAS 2008 70 CAS /A/1545 .
the harmonisation that the CAS makes of it would sit in parallel to these principles. That lex sportiva would not sit in the apex of the legal pyramid but it would inspire the regulation of sport.
Conclusion
Lex sportiva can be a very useful concept which would vindicate a high degree of specialisation within the sports and the sports law. So much so that a lex sportiva as principles generated from within would be a significant tool of homogenisation of the regulations of sport and protection of the core of self-regulation that the outside world should respect. On the contrary, CAS-centrism and claims for a special treatment of everything sport would convert lex sportiva a purely academic debate when not an excuse for the law to fix what it is not broken.
The definition of lex sportiva proposed in this article, "general principles of the regulations of sport shared by the sports community" has in common a respect for self-regulation and respect for mandatory law applicable in a case by case basis. That lex sportiva is easy to understand by those involved in sport, acceptable by those outside of it and applicable by any decision maker involved in a sports dispute.
